A drug dealer sends his supplier to pick up a box of cash from the dealer's wife. Can we assume without more that the dealer was his wife's "manager or supervisor," U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), or that he "used . . . affection" to involve her in his drug crimes, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(16)(A)?
Of course not. This is the twenty-first century. C'mon people.
See United States v. Sampel, 2021 WL 2793548 (2d Cir. July 6, 2021) ("Evidence that Sampel told a person to pick up money from his wife does not establish that Sampel “exercised [any] degree of control” over her . . . or that he in any way directed her involvement in the drug business. Likewise, this evidence does not support the conclusion that Sampel used affection to involve his wife in the crimes at issue. Simply put, more is needed.") (reversing and remanding for resentencing).
See also State v. Donkers, 867 N.E.2d 903, 939 (Ohio App. 2007) ("In today's society, regardless of what individual couples believe and practice, the law does not recognize the husband as the 'one public voice' or as the automatic head of household with supreme authority over his nonresponsible feme covert."); United States v. De Quilfeldt, 5 F. 276, 278 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1881) ("It is almost an absurdity in this day to pretend that husbands can or do coerce their wives into the commission of crimes . . . ; but to hold it to be presumed as a fact, in all cases where the husband is present, is the relic of a belief in the ignorance and pusillanimity of women which is not, and perhaps never was, well founded, and does them no credit."); but see Gray v. State, 527 P.2d 338 (Okla. Crim. App.
1674 1974) (noting "general rule that a wife committing a crime is presumed to have acted under her husband's coercion" if the husband is physically present at the time of the crime).